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Abstract
Corporate crimes, defined as “illegal and harmful acts committed by officer and
employees of corporations to promote corporate interests,” have a greater impact on
society than many street crimes. Corporate crime includes a range of white-collar crimes
that affect employees and consumers. White-collar and corporate crimes are often
ignored by the media unless there is involvement in some high profile scandal. There
tends to be a paucity of research associated with coal industry related corporate crimes.
This includes personal and death related events in the coal mining industry. This was
evident in the 2010 explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine in Montcoal, West Virginia
that resulted in the death of twenty-nine miners. The goals of this thesis include the
examination of how the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster was represented by various
institutions, including governmental agencies. Included are explanations of how Massey
Energy corporate officials violated safety regulations and permitted the continuous
operation of a mine that have been previously cited for numerous safety violations.
Ultimately, a position is presented that the injurious and harmful actions of Massey
Energy Corporation officials was criminal as opposed to a preventable accident.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Corporate crimes, defined as “illegal and harmful acts committed by officers and
employees of corporations to promote corporate interests,” (Friedrichs, 1996, p. 9), or
crimes of the powerful, have a far greater impact on society than that of many common
street crimes. Corporate crime can come in many different forms, including blackmail,
bribery, embezzlement of funds, and forgery of documents. Several of these forms of
corporate crime can be seen in the Enron scandal of 2001, where corporate executives
misrepresented company earnings, while encouraging employees to invest in the
company stock. In the end, this resulted in shareholders losing millions of dollars. In
addition, corporate crime can affect employees who work for a corporation and
consumers of any product that might be produced. Finally, corporate crimes can lead to
severe environmental harms, such as those associated with the BP Oil Spill of 2010.

1

Even so, white-collar and corporate crimes are often ignored by the media, unless
they involve a high profile scandal of some sort. As such, many people, including some
criminologists, do not perceive such acts as threatening or harmful to their own personal
safety. The media is more interested in reporting cases of “serious” or “violent” crime
that involves dramatic, sentimental, whimsical, or unusual elements. And by focusing on
these types of crime over others, the media is involved in “constructing” the typical views

1

In addition, corporate crime often is intertwined with what scholars of state crime call "statecorporate" crime, meaning the ways that the state often colludes with corporations in the
production of social harm and organizationally criminal behavior. This often involves the state
institution failing to prevent organizational harm through absent or lax regulation, or the active
encouragement of criminally or socially injurious by state and corporate entities.
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of crime and criminals: minority, particularly blacks, lower class, and possibly suffering
from some form of mental health issue (Robinson, 2011). Reiman and Leighton (2013)
identify the typical criminal in the popular imagination as male, young, predominately
urban, disproportionately black, and poor. And unlike most street crimes, which target
certain individuals, virtually every person has been affected by some form of white-collar
or corporate crime. For example, every tax-paying American saw his/her tax debt
increase as a result of the savings and loan scandal (Lynch et al., 2004).
In addition, the overall cost associated with white-collar and corporate crime is
substantially more than street crime. Several researchers have estimated that the annual
losses from white-collar crimes are approximately $200 billion to $400 billion per year
(Albanese, 1995, p. 85; Lynch, Michalowski, & Groves, 2000, p. 60). Thompson (1992),
for example, notes that in 1992 the cost of healthcare fraud alone by health care
professionals was $100 billion annually. In comparison, the total loss from conventional
street crime is approximately $5 billion per year on the low end (Calavita & Pontell,
1990, p. 309) to $10 billion at the high end (Albanese, 1995). These figures indicate that
the financial cost of white-collar and corporate crime far exceeds the costs associated
with street crime by a factor of twenty to forty times, or more.
Furthermore, the costs associated with white-collar and corporate crime are not
measured solely in financial terms. Research indicates that corporate crime also results in
a very high degree of mortality. On average, there are approximately 20,000 homicides
in the United States each year. In comparison, Simon (1982) estimates that roughly
100,000 people die each year in the United States from illnesses and injuries contracted
on the job, while another 390,000 are disabled because of occupational diseases. In
2

addition, Reiman and Leighton (2013) have determined that between 12,000 and 16,000
people die each year from unnecessary surgeries, while an additional 20,000 deaths can
be attributed to a failure to provide adequate medical care. Countless other deaths can be
credited to corporate manufacture and sale of unsafe and dangerous products, including
automobiles, pesticides and unsafe working conditions (Lynch et al., 2004). These
figures, when taken together, suggest, that corporate crimes place many more people at
risk of death or injury than street crime (Lynch et al., 2004).
Corporate Crime in Coal Mining
White-collar and corporate crime is largely underrepresented and researched,
particularly in relation to the occupation of coal mining. With an overwhelming amount
of the research in coal mining focusing on the environmental issues, the issue of worker
safety is almost non-existent throughout the literature (Stretesky & Lynch, 2011). This is
a significant exclusion based on the large number of injuries and even death within this
occupation. A study by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) found that between 1986 and 1995, over 130,000 on the job injuries were
reported to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Of those injuries,
almost 52,000 involved some type of musculature sprain or strain. In addition, almost
1,500 workers were crushed, while 247 reported injury from an electric shock. Finally,
701 workers between 1986 and 1995 incurred some form of chemical burn (NIOSH,
2000). Despite the numerous federal and state laws enacted throughout the years, mine
owners continue to consider the safety of their workers a low priority (Simon, 1982).
This is made quite evident by the fact that since 1900, nearly 100,000 miners have died
while on the job. NIOSH (2000) reported that between 1986 and 1995, 511 fatalities
3

occurred in coal mines. Of those fatalities, 141 occurred while using or operating tools or
machinery and almost 100 occurred during vehicle or transportation operations. In
addition, over 40 fatalities were the result of some form of electrical accident. NIOSH
(2000) also reported that between 1992 and 1995 of the 168 fatal injuries that occurred,
35 coal miners died after being caught in or crushed by collapsing material. That number
does not, however, include the more than 1,500 (mostly retired) miners that die every
year in the United States from black lung disease, contracted through exposure to coal
dust (Goodell, 2006).
Worker safety, particularly in the coal mining industry, is an issue that needs
increased and continuous attention. A coal miner needs to feel safe and protected each
and every time he or she goes to work ‒ a responsibility that falls on the shoulders of the
top officials of coal mining companies. While avoiding one hundred percent of accidents
and injuries is nearly impossible, in certain cases, the large number of deaths can be
prevented by following all safety guidelines and laws and using properly maintained
equipment.
Research Question and Methodology
In 2010, an explosion ripped through the underground Upper Big Branch Mine in
Montcoal, West Virginia, taking the lives of twenty-nine miners. This thesis aims to
examine how the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster was represented by different
institutions, including the state of West Virginia, as well as different media accounts. It
will analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of the accounts from these different
institutions and describe how each of them interpreted this tragic event – often in a way
that obscures alternative ways of understanding this explosion.
4

In order to accomplish this, this thesis, like previous research examining statecorporate crime, utilizes a case study approach. Specifically, this thesis employs what
Stake (2000) calls an instrumental case study, where a particular case is examined to
provide insight into a larger issue or context. In order to collect data, I have used what
Altheide (1996) calls “theoretical sampling.” This refers to the selection of materials
based on emerging understanding of the topic under investigation (Altheide, 1996). This
has allowed me to collect the data that I believe, based on the specific research questions
guiding this inquiry, provides me with the best insight into this particular case.
Ultimately, the data discussed here comes from government reports, such as McAteer and
colleagues Report to the Governor, and various media reports discussing the Upper Big
Branch Mine explosion. The Report to the Governor is the primary way in which the
Upper Big Branch explosion was understood and reported following the explosion ‒
hence the report is widely accepted as the official, authoritative account of this tragedy.
The beginning steps of my research involved identifying and locating any article I
could on the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster. Using multiple databases and resources, I
developed several key search words that allowed me not only to find very broad general
articles on the topic, but specific documents pertaining to investigations following the
disaster. By using this method of theoretical sampling, I ensured that I had a wide range
of material including government documents and different news media accounts of that
day, as well as images and statements from the families and friends of the miners who
died in the explosion. This approach has allowed me to examine the discourse used
throughout the investigations following the explosion, while paying particular attention to
ways different institutions and actors labeled the explosion ‒such as an “accident”,
5

“tragedy”, “disaster”, or as a “crime” – issues that I will discuss in more detail in
subsequent pages.
The intertwined questions guiding my analysis of this data are the following:
How was the explosion understood by the investigating committees and what discourse
did they and the mine authorities employ to explain the causes of this explosion? Finally,
what can be identified as the key factors or causes that led to the explosion? Following
these questions, I then engage these representations and understandings of the explosion
in order to come to, what I feel, is a more nuanced, critical criminological understanding
of the explosion.
In order to determine if any laws were broken during the time leading up to Upper
Big Branch Mine explosion, as well as if a statutory defined crime was actually
committed, the following chapter gives a brief history of coal mining regulations in the
United States. Following that, Chapter Three presents a case study of the Upper Big
Branch Mine explosion based on McAteer and colleagues report to the Governor, a report
released after a yearlong investigation following the explosion, as well as different media
accounts of the response to this disaster. Chapter Four gives a theoretical explanation of
Diane Vaughan‟s idea of the Normalization of Deviance, as well as Robinson and
Murphy‟s Contextual Anomie/Strain theory. Vaughan‟s concept of the Normalization of
Deviance suggest that based on a common theme of economic gain, officials will
knowingly violate laws to achieve their organizational goal, or profit. Applying
Vaughan‟s Normalization of Deviance to the case study, I argue that in this case, Massey
Energy, owners of Upper Big Branch, engaged in the normalization of deviance by
accepting unsafe working conditions and faulty equipment as the norm. Robinson and
6

Murphy‟s Contextual Anomie/Strain theory takes the American Dream concept and
brings the idea of maximization where greed plays an important role. In the case of the
Upper Big Branch Mine, Massey Energy displayed a corporate mentality that placed the
drive to produce and profit above worker safety. Finally, Chapter Five explains what
actually constitutes a crime in general and explain any changes to the laws after this
tragic accident.
Overall, this thesis will explain how Massey Energy and Upper Big Branch Mine
officials knowingly violated safety regulations and allowed work to continue in a mine
that had previously been cited numerous times for those violations. Ultimately, I will
argue that the injurious or harmful actions of Massey Energy is best thought of as,
“criminal,” as opposed to just another tragic unpreventable accident.

7

Chapter Two: A Brief History of U.S. Coal Mining Safety Regulations

Seventeenth century coal mines were probably one of the most dangerous
workplaces in which to operate. Coal mining was one of the few occupations where a
worker had to be concerned with all four classical elements – earth, water, fire, and air.
Surrounded by a dark, damp, and chilly atmosphere, miners had to deal with ceilings that
had the potential to collapse on their heads, air that could smother, poison, or combust,
and water that could rush in and drown them. Every time a miner went underground,
he/she understood the risk associated with it and knew there was a chance he/she would
never see the surface again (Freese, 2003). In 1891, Congress passed the first federal
statute governing mine safety, a general mining law known as the 1891Act. This law
established minimum ventilation requirements at all underground mines and prohibited
mine operators from employing anyone under the age of twelve (“History of Mine,” n.d.)
While this law may have helped avoid some disasters and save some lives, it did
not prevent one of the worst mining accidents in United States‟ history: a methane
explosion in Monongah, West Virginia, in 1907 that killed 361 workers. Although this
disaster left 250 widows and 1,000 children fatherless, it took another three years and a
dozen mine disasters throughout the country and over 1,200 more dead miners before
Congress passed additional legislation creating the U.S. Bureau of Mines (the “Bureau”)
as a new agency in the Department of Interior.
Congress instructed the Bureau to investigate mining methods, “especially with
respect to miners, and…the possible improvements of conditions under which mining
8

operations are carried on” (Goodell, 2006, p. 60). This legislation, however, provided no
enforcement power at all. Inspectors could not even enter a mine without permission
from the owner and, if they did, they were not allowed to publicize their findings. Three
decades passed, along with thousands of coal miners, before Congress granted the Bureau
the authority to inspect mines and publicize any findings. Enforcement power, however,
would still have to wait (Goodell, 2006).
In 1947, after yet another investigation following an explosion in a mine in
Illinois that killed over one hundred miners, it was revealed by the United Mine Workers
of America that years of warnings about dangerous conditions in the mine were
repeatedly ignored by the mine owner. After testimony given before Congress by the
head of the United Mine Workers of America, Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine
Safety Act of 1952, which President Harry Truman signed into law. Though this
legislation was riddled with loopholes, including the fact that it excluded all surface
mines and mine operations that employed fewer than fifteen people, it did, however,
provide annual inspections in certain underground coal mines and gave the Bureau
limited enforcement authority. This included the power to issue violation notices and
imminent danger withdrawal orders. The Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952 act also
authorized the assessment of civil penalties against mine operators and gave mine
inspectors the power to shut down certain types of dangerous mines.
Even with this legislation, the deaths did not stop. An explosion in 1968 in
Farmington, West Virginia, changed the course of mine history and transformed mine
safety and health in the United States. Seventy-eight miners lost their lives in a mine that
had a history of accidents as well as numerous safety violations. After the explosion, a
9

fire broke out that burned for days before the mine was sealed to smother the flames; the
bodies of the miners trapped inside were never recovered. As a result of this tragedy, the
public once again demanded change and the following year, Congress passed the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act), which dramatically increased the
enforcement powers of the Bureau. It also gave miners the right to request a federal
inspection and for the first time required two annual inspections at every surface and four
at every underground coal mine. The Coal Act also required monetary penalties for all
violations and established criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations. Finally,
the Coal Act provided benefits to miners totally and permanently disabled by “black
lung” (Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969). The passing of this legislation was
truly a landmark in coal mining safety in the United States, although, it came too late for
the nearly 100,000 miners who had been killed since 1900 (Goodell, 2006; “History of
Mine,” n.d.).
Though the rate of fatal accidents declined gradually in the year following
passage, President Richard M. Nixon undercut the enforcement power of the Bureau with
his appointment to top positions within it, leading the General Accounting Office to
describe the policies for enforcing health and safety standards within the Interior
Department as “extremely lenient, confusing, and inequitable.” Eventually the power to
inspect mines and enforce all safety laws was transferred from the Department of the
Interior to the Department of Labor in 1977, where a new agency, the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA), was created. Even with this change, however, the
enforcement of laws against coal companies continued to fail.
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In 1976, in Letcher County, Kentucky, two gas and coal dust explosions occurred
in as many days in the Scotia Coal Mine. The first explosion resulted in large part from
inadequate ventilation, as well as from improper maintenance of electric equipment. The
equipment also contained components that created “incentive arcing” or “sparking”
during normal operation in an area where methane had accumulated. In addition, the
required examinations had not been made prior to the operation of the electrical
equipment. The second explosion was a result of lack of sufficient air to ventilate certain
areas of the mine where there was a known methane accumulation. As a result, twentysix people total were killed in these two explosions.
Following this disaster, Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 (Mine Act). The Mine Act amended the 1969 Coal Act in numerous ways and
consolidated all federal health and safety regulations of the mining industry. The Mine
Act also strengthened and expanded the rights of miners, including, in the case of a mine
being ordered to close, the right to full compensation by the mine operator at regular rates
of pay for the entire period a miner is idle, and increased the protection of miners from
retaliation for exercising those rights. As a result, mining fatalities dropped significantly
from almost 300 in 1977 to just fewer than 90 by 2000. In addition, after the creation of
MSHA in this same year, the Mine Act established the independent Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission to provide for independent review of the majority of
MSHA‟s enforcement actions (“History of Mine,” n.d.).
The most recent mining disaster that resulted in the enactment of a new piece of
legislation was the 2006 disaster at the Sago Mine in West Virginia. This disaster, like so
many before it, occurred from a methane explosion in a recently sealed area of the mine
11

that blew out the seals and sent smoke, dust, debris, and lethal doses of carbon monoxide
into working sections of the mine. As a result of this explosion, one miner died instantly
following the blast while twelve others were trapped for almost two days and ultimately
died of carbon monoxide asphyxiation before they could be rescued (Mine Improvement
and New Emergency Response Act of 2006).
Once again following another deadly mining disaster, the public demanded
answers. Questions regarding MSHA‟s competency and willingness to enforce mining
laws were brought up after an investigation revealed that the Sago Mine had been cited
for more than 200 federal safety violations during the previous year. West Virginia
Senator Robert Byrd brought these questions to the forefront during a powerful Senate
floor speech, asking “ Could an automobile driver…rack up 276 speeding tickets and still
have a license?...But here was a coal company with 276 violations and still operating”
(Goodell, 2006, p. 64). As a result, Congress passed the Mine Improvement and New
Emergency Response Act of 2006 (“MINER Act”), which dramatically increased the
fines against mining companies that repeatedly violate federal safety rules.
The MINER Act required emergency response plans in all underground coal
mines, added new regulations regarding mine rescue teams and the sealing of abandoned
areas, and required prompt notification of mine accidents. The MINER Act also
enhanced civil penalties up to $220,000 for flagrant violations and criminal penalties up
to $250,000 for the first offense and $500,000 for the second. Finally, the MINER Act
required wireless two-way communication and electronic tracking systems that provide
post-accident communication between underground and surface personnel, and allow
surface personnel the ability to locate any person trapped underground.
12

Despite all the legislation requiring safer working conditions and better mining
equipment, according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), mining is still one of the most dangerous occupations in America, with
underground coal mines the most dangerous of all. Fatality rates in underground mines
are five times higher than in surface coal mines (NIOSH, 2004). In West Virginia, coal
mines have recorded the highest rate of fatal accidents and injuries in the United States,
and mines in southern West Virginia, where the Upper Big Branch Mine is located, have
been exceptionally deadly. In 1996, a study by MSHA found that 70 miners were killed
on the job in southern West Virginia that year. This means that 28 percent of all U.S.
mining fatalities occurred in an area that employs only 13 percent of the nation‟s miners.
Indeed, McAteer (2001) found that between 1991 and 2000, 25 percent of the country‟s
458 coal mining fatalities occurred in southern West Virginia (McAteer, 2001; McAteer
et al., 2011).
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Chapter Three: The Upper Big Branch Mine Explosion: A Case Study

The Explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine
At approximately 3:02 p.m., Monday, April 5th, 2010, a powerful explosion
ruptured through two and one-half miles of underground at the Upper Big Branch (UBB)
mine in southern West Virginia. Killing twenty-nine miners and seriously injuring one,
this incident was the worst mining disaster in the United States in 40 years.
The twenty-nine miners killed that day ranged in age from twenty to sixty-one
with experience levels from only a few years to thirty-six years‒including one miner who
was just weeks away from retirement. Not only were these individuals coal miners, but
several of them were also volunteer firefighters at their local departments and one was a
substitute teacher and coach for various sports. There were also several veterans who
became coal miners after they completed their service.
The explosion was so powerful some miners were actually decapitated, while
others smothered to death under the rubble. Following the explosion, search and rescue
crews began to search for those still alive trapped inside and recover the bodies of the
deceased. In the case of one miner, it took several days to find his remains because he
was blown into the roof of the mine, and those searching for him were looking only down
at the ground and to either side. As the search and rescue mission continued, family
members of the miners began arriving at the scene. One family member, who later found
out her son was one of the deceased, described how “cold” the scene really was. “They
would shout out, if I call your name, go over to Whitesville Fire Department and identify
14

the body,” while another said, “no one [from Massey Energy] called us” following the
blast (Galuska, 2012).
A week following the explosion on April 13, 2010, then West Virginia Governor
Joe Manchin III asked J. Davitt McAteer, former Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge
of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), to conduct an
independent investigation into the disaster. McAteer formed the Governor‟s Independent
Investigation Panel (GIIP), enlisting the help of a group of colleagues with expertise in
coal mining, mining law, mining communities, occupational safety and public health.
After a yearlong investigation, the GIIP released a report and concluded that the
explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine could have been prevented and was a direct
result of the actions and omissions of the mine owner, Massey Energy, and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (McAteer et al., 2011). The following chapter is based
on the GIIP‟s report.
The Aftermath of the Explosion
Throughout the entire investigative process, Massey Energy stood by its assertion
that the explosion was caused by a massive and unforeseen inundation of methane or
natural gas from a crack in the mine floor. Every mine explosion, however, leaves
behind a footprint that presents clues to investigators about things, such as where the
blast originated and how the force traveled from the ignition point. MSHA officials
offered their opinion prior to the investigation that the explosion at Upper Big Branch
was caused by “the combustion of accumulations of methane, combined with
combustible coal dust mixed with air.” The footprint left behind supports the position
that the explosion actually started with the ignition of a small amount of methane gas and
15

was then fueled by coal dust that had been allowed to build up for miles throughout the
mine (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 67).
All the eyewitnesses that could have testified as to what happened in the minutes
leading up to and just after the explosion were dead. Physical evidence left behind,
however, allows the following conclusions to be drawn. As the shearer operator cut into
the sandstone top of the longwall, the friction created sparks, which occurs quite
frequently in underground mining. Typically, when machinery cuts into coal there is
some sparking because the coal is soft. But when the shearer hits rock surrounding coal,
sparks fly. In this case, the sparks ignited a pocket of methane or natural gas that had
likely risen from the floor or had migrated from the gob,‒ an area of the mine behind the
longwall. The shearer, which is equipped with water sprays designed to put out a flame at
the point of ignition, was later tested, it was found that the sprays were ineffective
because some had been removed or were clogged. The crew working in this area could
do nothing to stop the spread of the fireball, as it ignited the buildup of coal dust.
The explosion was a series of explosions created as the compressed air on the
leading edge of the force caused the coal dust to become airborne. As a result of this, the
explosion actually generated its own fuel with the air/dust mixture behaving like a line of
gunpowder, carrying the blast in multiple different directions (McAteer et al., 2011, p.
23).
The GIIP determined that the explosion was the result of the failures of three main
basic safety systems that were identified and codified to protect the lives of miners. First,
water sprays on the equipment were not properly maintained and failed to function as
they should have. Second, the company failed to meet federal and state safe principal
16

standards for the application of rock dust. As a result, coal dust provided the fuel that
allowed the explosion to spread. Third, the ventilation system did not adequately
ventilate the mine, which lead to the buildup of gases throughout the mine. Because of
these three failures, even a small ignition could not have been quickly extinguished if
needed (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 4).
Working with faulty equipment. The GIIP concluded that maintenance of
safety equipment was not a priority at the Upper Big Branch Mine, as evidenced by the
condition of the shearer, broken rock dusters, and defective airlock doors. This lack of
maintenance, particularly on the shearer, was a direct cause of the explosion. MSHA
officials conducted tests following the explosion and found that the water sprays on the
shearer were ineffective due to the fact that some were clogged and others had been
removed all together. Worn bits on the machine were also found, which exposed steel
shafts that increased the danger of sparking when they hit rock. Further MSHA testing
revealed that even if the shearer had been working properly, water lines on the longwall
could not adequately supply water to the shearer when needed to suppress a fire
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 23, 99).
The lack of properly maintained equipment is further evidenced through the
numerous post-explosion violations cited by MSHA. The GIIP found that the mantrap,
the vehicles used to transport workers throughout the mine, were in terrible condition and
the main track haulage was not properly maintained throughout much of the mine.
Testimony was given to the GIIP that suggested that the methane detectors, located on
numerous pieces of equipment and used to alert miners to high levels of methane in the
mine, had been “bridged out” or disabled. This was done in order to keep up production
17

without taking time to make repairs when the detectors indicated such high levels. Not
only is disabling equipment a violation of state and federal law, but it put workers in
constant danger. Although equipment disabling has not been directly linked to the
explosion itself there is a chance it helped fuel the fire (McAteer et al., p. 99).
Coal dust and rock dust. Rock dust, or crushed limestone, has long been
regarded as a vital safety component in underground mines because it dilutes the
explosive nature of coal dust. The large Upper Big Branch Mine had only a two man
crew who worked part-time spreading rock dust throughout the entire mine during the
overnight shift. In addition, the senior member of this crew was repeatedly pulled off his
dusting duty to perform other jobs (McAteer et al., 2011).
The Upper Big Branch Mine used track-mounted tanks or pod dusters to rock dust
the track haulage, belt lines, airways, working sections and construction sites. To
effectively use a track duster in a mine this size would have required drilling a borehole
midway in the mine and not far from the working sections. This would have allowed a
quick delivery of bulk rock dust to refill the tank dusters. Investigators found no such
borehole at Upper Big Branch, however. This meant the rock dust crew had to take a
loaded duster from the outside the mine to its point of destination and disperse the dust
and when the duster was empty, they had to travel back outside to refill it. Because it
was a two-hour round trip to refill a duster, it is unlikely that more than one tank of dust
per shift or per day was applied using the orange duster. Miners, using forty pound bags
of dust that were transported to the sections on flat cars, would spread rock dust by hand
on the floors and walls of working sections. This still meant the roof was not dusted,
however, even though it was required by law. Miners found it difficult to spread it on the
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top of the mine by hand and some even testified that trying to do so made it extremely
hard for them to breathe (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 50).
Dusting, which was complicated to begin with given the size of the crew in
relation to the size of the mine, was made even more difficult due to the fact that the big
orange duster at Upper Big Branch did not work properly much of the time. The senior
member of the dusting crew said, “Sometimes it would clog up, so we would have to
spend 30 minutes trying to unclog the hoses…then it would clog again.” Other workers
gave testimony that “It [the pod duster] would break a lot…you have to have it just right”
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 50). Due to the age of the duster and lack of adequate
maintenance, however, it was not surprising that this two-man crew had constant trouble
with the duster. This was immediately evident to investigators when Massey employees
attempted to use the duster to perform MSHA-required dusting the first time following
the explosion: the motor burned up. According to documents obtained from the
manufacturer of the duster, by the time this incident occurred, the duster was more than
twenty-five years old and had not been rebuilt for at least seven years (McAteer et al.,
2011, p. 50-51).
In order for the Upper Big Branch Mine to have been in compliance with the
minimum state and federal regulations, management should have assigned crews to rock
dust designated areas of the mine each shift. The only way a mine the size of Upper Big
Branch could justify a two-man crew would be if they were assigned solely to rock
dusting on at least two shifts each day, and preferably on all three shifts. The age and
poorly maintained condition of equipment, combined with the fact that Upper Big Branch
did not have an established dusting crew that followed a schedule led the GIIP to
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conclude that at Upper Big Branch rock dusting was not a priority in the early days of
2010 (McAteer et al., 2011, p.51).
Worker testimony is not the only evidence of inadequate dusting. In 2009,
mining inspectors with the West Virginia Office of Miners‟ Health Safety and Training
(WVMHST) issued 26 citations at UBB mine for coal dust accumulation and for failure
to adequately apply rock dust. In addition, in the fifteen months prior to the disaster,
federal and state inspectors issued citations every month except one for rock dust issues.
Violations were found in all four sections of the mine, as well as the longwall, and along
several of the belts, and nearly half of the 40 citations issued by MSHA were classified as
“significant and substantial” (McAteer et al., 2011, p.54).
Despite the very detailed requirements outlined in the Coal Act of 1969, the GIIP
found that Massey did not have adequate procedures in place to ensure that the company
complied with rock dust requirements. Officials from Massey Energy, however, have
repeatedly stated that coal dust played no part in the explosion at the Upper Big Branch
Mine. The company‟s general counsel, Shane Harvey, even told the Associated Press
that the mine “appears to have been very well rock-dusted with rock dust still in place”
(McAteer et al., 2011, p.54-55). Witness testimony, the series of citations issued by state
and federal officials, the preshift examination records of the conveyor belts, the absence
of a systematic rock dust procedure, the fact that rock dust crews were given other
assignments, the physical distance the explosion traveled, and the findings from the rock
dust samples taken after the explosion, strongly suggest otherwise. Moreover, if coal
dust had not been a factor in the explosion, the damage might have been contained to just
the longwall area. That was not the case, however, because pieces of several victims on
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the mantrap were found as far away as 1.15 miles from the longwall, and parts of victims
on Headgate 22 were found about 0.75 miles from the longwall as a result of the force of
the explosion (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 54-55).
Inadequate ventilation. Every underground coal mine in the United States is
required by the 1891 Act to have a ventilation system approved by MSHA. This system
is designed to push fresh air through the mine, remove coal dust and keep air in the mine
from being stagnant, and prevent the buildup of methane and other toxic gases. The
system also helps keep previously mined areas free from any buildup of gas. The
ventilation system used at Upper Big Branch Mine was known as a push-pull system. In
the north area of the mine, the air was pushed into the mine at the North Portal and then
pulled through the mine by the Bandytown fan. Once the air had traveled its intended
course, it then exited the mine through several different return entries as well as the main
return shaft.
The system at the Upper Big Branch Mine had one major design flaw. The fans
needed to push and pull air throughout the mine were configured solely to direct air in a
straight line, even though miners worked in areas away from the horizontal path. As a
result, air had to be diverted from its natural flow pattern into the working sections on the
longwall, Headgate 22, Tailgate 22, and the crossover sections. All of these sections
were located on different sides of the natural flow pattern, meaning multiple ventilation
controls had to be constructed that were frequently in competition with one another. This
competition for air led to dangerous practices of ad hoc modifications to the ventilation
system by foremen who were concerned with providing adequate air for their crews.
While the fans had sufficient capacity to adequately ventilate a mine with a physical size
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as large as Upper Big Branch, the challenge was that the air had to be forced and directed
through multiple “ventilation controls,” including stoppings, overcasts, regulators, seals
and airlock doors, to make sure all areas were adequately ventilated. The location,
construction and maintenance of these controls were critical to proper functioning of a
ventilation system. During the investigation at Upper Big Branch, the GIIP found that
several of these controls were missing, poorly constructed, and in need of repair.
In addition, state, federal and independent investigators were all in agreement that
there were too many airlock doors at Upper Big Branch Mine. These doors were used to
prevent air from short-circuiting as workers and equipment enter and moved throughout
the different areas of the mine. That said, the problem with using airlock doors is that the
air can be short-circuited if the doors were left open, and workers testified this was often
the case in an attempt to allow more air into the areas in which they were working.
Miners also testified that the doors were not properly maintained, which resulted in
leakage in and around them (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 60-61).
Federal and state inspection records also indicate that Upper Big Branch Mine
was cited every month during 2009 for failure to ventilate the mine according to the
approved ventilation plan. Violations included insufficient air reaching sections of the
mine and stoppings with holes in them, airlock doors open on both sides, and reversed
airflow and resulted in 64 citations in all. In addition, in early 2010, an MSHA inspector
claimed that Performance Coal‟s, a subsidiary of Massey Energy, senior management
officials showed a “reckless disregard” for worker safety when they told a foreman to
ignore a citation the mine received for faulty ventilation (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 60, 62).
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The GIIP found that a continuously failing ventilation system and the mine‟s
upper management officials reluctance to fix known problems resulted in a build-up of
methane gas that, in the end, provided the fuel needed for an explosion to take place. A
methane explosion will take place when the buildup of methane gas comes into contact
with an ignition source, like a flame or spark. In spite of the fact that sparking is
common in the mining process, small methane ignitions do not have to turn into major
explosions if mine operators adhere to basic safety measures, such as maintaining
ventilation systems, removing explosive coal dust from mining operations, spreading
required amounts of rock dust, and ensuring that water sprays are functioning properly.
Due to the fact that these basic safety systems failed at Upper Big Branch, a minor flare
up of methane gas led to the nation‟s worst coal mining disaster in 40 years (McAteer et
al., 2011, p. 67).
The Massey Way
At the time of the Upper Big Branch explosion, Massey Energy, which was
formed in 1916, was the fourth leading coal producer in the country and the largest in the
Appalachian region, producing approximately 40 million tons of coal each year from
underground and surface mines in Virginia, West Virginia and Kentucky. The company
is infamous for causing incalculable damage to mountains, streams and air in the
coalfields, as well as for creating health risks for coalfield residents through the pollution
of streams, injecting slurry into the ground and failing to control coal waste dams and
dust emissions. Massey Energy has also been known to use vast amounts of money to
influence the political system and to battle government regulations regarding safety in
coal mines and environmental safeguards for communities. CEO Don Blankenship, who
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was a prominent GOP fundraiser, contributed more than $300,000 to federal candidates
during the decade prior to the 2010 explosion. In addition, in 2004, Blankenship spent
$3.5 million on vicious attack ads in a campaign to replace a long-time West Virginia
Supreme Court justice while a case with a great financial significance to Massey Energy
was pending before the court (McGarity, 2012).
The Upper Big Branch Mine was not the first Massey owned mine to experience a
disaster. In 2006, a fire in their Aracoma Alma Mine #1 broke out as a result of what
federal authorities called “reckless disregard” for safety rules and negligent mining
practices. MSHA determined that the company failed to adhere to basic safety standards
consisting of installing a sprinkler system and maintaining a water supply that could have
been used to fight the fire. Ultimately, the most serious safety violation involved the
removal of ventilation controls allowing the fire to enter the miners‟ primary escape
passage once the fire broke out. In 2009, federal indictments were issued and Aracoma
Coal Company entered a guilty plea to ten criminal violations of mine safety law related
to the fatal fire and agreed to pay a $2.5 million criminal fine. Included in the plea was
one felony count of willful violation of mandatory safety standards resulting in death,
eight counts of willful violation of mandatory safety standards, and one count of a false
statement. While MSHA investigated the fatalities, more than 1,300 citations against the
company for violating federal mine safety laws and regulations were issued. Massey paid
an additional $1.7 million to resolve the citations culminating in a combined total of $4.2
million in criminal and civil penalties. To date, this is the largest fine imposed on a coal
company in the history of federal mine safety laws.
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More than four years after the disaster at Aracoma Alma Mine, new evidence was
found that Don Blankenship, the company‟s chairman and chief executive officer, was
aware of the problems at the mine prior to the fire. A reporter for The Charleston Gazette
explained that Blankenship sent someone to investigate the condition of the conveyor belt
in the mine. A memo detailing the findings, dated just six days before the fire, described
the condition as “indeed it was not okay,” yet work continued throughout the mine
(McAteer et al., 2011, p. 92-93).
Following its investigation of the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, the American
University‟s School of Communications released a detailed analysis of Massey‟s safety
record conducted by its Investigative Reporting Workshop. It found that between 2000
and 2010, no United States coal company had a worse fatality record than Massey
Energy. Fifty-four workers were killed in Massey mines during that times, including the
twenty-nine in the April 5th explosion, as well as two who died at other mines after that.
After the release of the report, Blankenship claimed that working in Massey mines
involved “difficult underground conditions” and that the number of deaths was “about
average.” This assertion is contravening, however. American University investigators,
who found that during the same time period, only six fatalities occurred in the mines
operated by the nation‟s largest coal producer, Peabody Energy. During that same time
frame, investigators also found that Massey had been cited for 62,923 violations,
including 25,612 considered “significant and substantial.” MSHA proposed $49.9
million in fines against Massey‒ $15 million more than any other company (McAteer et
al., 2011, p. 92-93).
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Throughout all of the investigations, Blankenship consistently maintained that
safety was his number one priority since he became part of Massey‟s management team
and “Massey does not place profits over safety” (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 94). Several
miners, however, gave testimony that “they want production” and those who tried “to do
the right thing” in terms of safe mining were “usually the people that [got] kicked in the
teeth for it” (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 95).
Following their practice of twisting information to their advantage, Massey
Energy officials continuously made public statements that the explosion at the Upper Big
Branch Mine was a tragedy that could not have been anticipated or prevented, though
evidence has been presented to the contrary.
The Role of Federal Officials
In the weeks following the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, officials with MSHA
consistently defended their agency‟s performance in this particular mine. They also
pointed out that the federal Mine Act places the responsibility for providing a safe
workplace solely on the shoulders of the employer, and insist that the operator is the one
ultimately responsible for operating a safe mine. And while to a certain extent this is
true, it is not the whole story.
Simply having laws on the books has never been enough to ensure worker safety
and the ability of a government to strictly enforce those laws is a “hard-earned right paid
for with the blood of coal miners” (McAteer et al., 2011). Mine health and safety
regulations have the potential to narrow an operator‟s profit margin and some mine
owners try to evade, ignore or sidestep those regulations. Because of this, workers need a
strong watchdog to ensure that this drive for profit is not allowed to minimize workers‟
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rights to a safe workplace. In the case of coal miners, the watchdog at the federal level is
MSHA.
MSHA receives a sizable annual appropriation from Congress to issue regulations
and ensure that mine operators comply with them. In 2010, that appropriation was
$357.3 million. With 92 duty stations across the country, the agency‟s 2,300 employees
are responsible for inspecting coal mines and other operations, such as stone quarries,
metal mines and dredging operations. They also monitor a variety of mandates on mine
operators, including requirements to submit and receive approval on engineering plans
for ventilation, dust control and roof control, in addition to training and emergency
response plans. MSHA officials are authorized to enter any mine property at will and
are, in fact, required to conduct complete mine inspections four times per year at every
underground mine and twice a year at every surface mine. They are also supposed to
conduct spot inspections every five days at a mine that releases excessive quantities of
methane (McAteer et al., 2011).
An inspector‟s job, when done correctly, is quite tough. The best mine inspectors
must have not only keen eyes and ears, but must know the regulations inside and out.
They must also be able to quickly digest the mine‟s ventilation, roof control and other
engineering plans, and to thoroughly document their observations. In addition, inspectors
must also develop thick skin because they spend days at a time in the mine with the very
company officials they cite for safety violations. After writing these citations, the
inspectors must then return to the mine to make sure the safety violations in question
have been addressed (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 76).
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Some mining companies, Massey Energy included, seize the opportunity to
challenge an inspector‟s action by disputing the findings and arguing about what the law
actually requires. Massey‟s Vice President for Safety Elizabeth Chamberlin, even
reportedly took a violation written by an inspector, looked at her people and said, “Don‟t
worry, we‟ll litigate it away” (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 77). And as one long-time MSHA
official told investigators, “Massey trains our inspectors better than we do” (McAteer et
al., 2011, p.77) ‒ meaning the way inspectors are treated during inspections at Massey
mines affects the enforcement attitude of the inspectors.
Realizing that some companies are more prone to test the boundaries of safe
practices, Congress gave MSHA the power to establish what it terms a “pattern of
violation” category laid out in the Mine Act of 1977 (McAteer et al., 2011). This
category was created to address mine operators who are cited over and over again for
“significant and substantial” violations. MSHA was also given the authority to determine
what constitutes a “pattern of violation” and is responsible for notifying a mine operator
when it falls into this category. Any “significant and substantial” violation issued by an
inspector within 90 days after a “pattern of violation” is determined will result in miners
being ordered out of the affected area. But it was not until 2006 that MSHA began to
notify a small number of operators that they had a “potential” pattern of violation and of
the 20 operators who received warning letters, Massey Energy mines received four of
them. None of the mines however, actually received any stiffer sanctions because once
they had reduced their violation rates, they were taken off the “potential pattern of
violation” list (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 77).
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At the Upper Big Branch Mine, in particular, federal officials were kept very
busy. Inspectors spent 1,854 hours at the mine in 2009, which is nearly twice the amount
of time they spent there in 2007. Moreover, in 2009, 515 citations and orders for safety
violations were written, including 48 withdrawal orders for repeated significant and
substantial violations. The monetary penalties accrued from these violations totaled
nearly $1.1 million.
Several provisions of the MINER Act, passed in 2006, gave MSHA tougher new
enforcement tools, including the authority to issue “flagrant” violations, with fines of up
to $220,000, against companies which repeatedly failed “to make reasonable efforts to
eliminate a known violation of a mandatory health or safety standard that…reasonably
could have been expected to cause death or serious bodily injury.” In the last five years
prior to the writing of the report to the Governor (2006-2011), MSHA has used this
authority in coal mines more than 125 times, resulting in $19.5 million.
Despite the fact that the Upper Big Branch Mine was cited dozens of times in the
years before to the explosion for violating ventilation plan requirements, MSHA never
once cited Upper Big Branch for a flagrant violation. Despite MSHA‟s considerable
authority and resources available, its collective knowledge and experience of inspectors,
the disaster at Upper Big Branch Mine suggests that the agency failed its duty as the
watchdog for coal miners. And when asked MSHA officials have not been able to
explain why they failed to use the “flagrant” tool at Upper Big Branch, an MSHA
spokesperson has replied that it is a matter being examined by MSHA‟s “internal review”
team (McAteer et al., 2011).
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Response Following the Explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine
Just nine days after the explosion Representative George Miller, a California
Democrat and chair of the House Education and Labor Committee, released a list of
forty-eight mines that had been identified by federal mine safety officials for increased
scrutiny but had not been so investigated due to unresolved appeals filed by the mine
operators. Of the forty-eight mines Miller named, six of them were owned by the same
operator of the Upper Big Branch Mine, Massey Energy.
Under current law, once MSHA issues a letter warning a mine operator that it
may be sanctioned under a “pattern of violation,” a mine must take immediate actions to
reduce future violations or risk facing drastic sanctions, including mine closure. To meet
the criteria of a “pattern of violation,” a mine must receive at least twenty significant and
substantial violations, two elevated enforcement actions, and one unwarrantable failure
violation over the previous twenty-four months. A mine must also have a violation rate
that is 25 percent higher than the industry average over the same period.
The Upper Big Branch Mine was issued 515 citations in 2009. This number
should have been enough to place them in the “pattern of violation” category and
possibly be shut down. Because officials at Massey Energy contested so many of them,
however, the Upper Big Branch Mine was not closed. Representative Miller explained
that he believed the reason the mines were never actually closed was that the companies
repeatedly appeal citations which prolongs the review process, and this was made quite
evident in a backlog of the more than 16,000 appeals on the books (Mosk, 2010; Ward,
2010).
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Following the explosion at Upper Big Branch, MSHA issued a report to President
Obama detailing the “troublesome” safety record of Massey Energy. The President
subsequently called this disaster “a failure, first and foremost, of management, but also a
failure of oversight and a failure of laws so riddled with loopholes that they allow unsafe
conditions to continue.” Furthermore, President Obama stated that “We owe [the people
of West Virginia] more than our prayers. We owe them action…They ought to know that
behind them there is a company that‟s doing what it takes to protect them, and a
government that is looking out for their safety.”
In its report, MSHA stated that it would not only seek to gain subpoena power and
the authority and means to protect whistle-blowers but also the ability the make
“knowing violations” of safety laws felonies rather than misdemeanors. MSHA also
wants to encourage miners to report safety violations by ensuring that they do not lose
pay if regulators order the withdrawal of workers from unsafe mining conditions. Had
MSHA possessed such power prior to the April 5th explosion, the lives of 29 miners
might have been saved (Shear & Mufson, 2010).
In April of the year following the explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine,
criminal prosecutions began. The first prosecution was of a Massey Energy employee
who formally worked at the Upper Big Branch Mine. Thomas Harrah, a foreman at the
Upper Big Branch Mine, pled guilty to faking a foreman‟s license when he performed
key mine safety examinations and to lying to investigators following the 2010 disaster,
both of which received felony sentencing. Upon receiving his sentencing, Harrah spent
10 months in jail (Ward, 2011).
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Massey Energy‟s Security chief, Hughie Stover, was the next former Upper Big
Branch employee convicted of criminal charges in the case of the 2010 explosion. Stover
was convicted of two felonies: making false statements and obstructing justice during the
investigation following the explosion. A jury concluded that Stover lied to investigators,
as well as destroyed evidence about Massey‟s practice of warning underground workers
when federal inspectors arrived. U.S Attorney Booth Goodwin argued that Stover‟s
actions, including requiring mine security guards to act as lookouts for mine inspectors,
and making radio announcements the moment an inspector arrived, played a major role in
causing explosion that killed 29 miners.
In its report following the incident, MSHA also concluded that Massey
“established a practice of using staff to relay advance notice of health and safety
inspections to mine personnel when federal and state inspectors arrived at the mine.”
MSHA claimed this advanced notice allowed employees to conceal violations and avoid
fixing major problems, and prosecutors stated that Stover “played a singular and
indispensable role in these warnings.” By statute, Stover could have faced a maximum of
25 years in prison for his actions that directly led to the deaths of 29 miners (Ward,
2012a). In February 2012, however, he was sentenced to three years in federal prison for
lying to investigators and ordering a subordinate to destroy documents (Ove, 2012).
The third person to be charged in the federal criminal investigation of the Upper
Big Branch Mine disaster is also the highest ranking official charged to date. Mine
superintendent, Gary May, was charged with conspiracy to defraud the federal
government‟s mine safety enforcement efforts by covering up dangerous conditions prior
to the April 2010 explosion. Like Stover, May was accused of taking part in a scheme to
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provide advance warning of government inspections and then hiding or correcting
violations before federal agents could make it into working sections of the mine. U.S.
Attorney Booth Goodwin and Assistant U.S. Attorney Steve Ruby also allege that May
“caused and ordered” methane monitors to be disabled on a continuous mining machine
at Upper Big Branch less than two months prior to the explosion. Furthermore, May was
alleged to have ordered another employee at Upper Big Branch to falsify mine
examination records by omitting hazardous conditions, such as high water, even though it
is required that it be reported and then repaired. May could have faced up to five years in
prison for the one felony charge (Ward, 2012b), but in January 2013, he agreed to a plea
deal and was sentenced to just twenty-one months in prison, along with three years of
probation and a $20,000 fine for one felony count of conspiracy to impede the federal
government‟s mine safety efforts (Ward, 2013). Blankenship, for his part as CEO,
escaped unscathed.
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Chapter Four: The Normalization of Deviance at the Upper Big Branch
Mine

The Normalization of Deviance
Driven by the pressures from the competitive environment, business managers
and government officials may violate the law to attain certain desired organizational
goals. This will occur unless the legal penalties exceed whatever benefits the company
could gain by violation. For example in 1986, the Challenger space shuttle exploded due
to the failure of a rubber O-ring designed to seal joints on the shuttle‟s solid rocket
booster. After repeated warning by contractor engineers that launching was risky in the
cold temperatures at the time, NASA managers who were immediately responsible for
the decision to launch disregarded the advice and proceeded with the launch because
sticking to the schedule was all-important at the space agency. Studies show, however,
that in the years preceding the launch, engineers and managers together developed a
definition of the situation, which Diane Vaughan, a professor of sociology and
international and public affairs at Columbia University refers to as the “normalization of
deviance”‒a definition that allowed them to carry on as if nothing were wrong, when this
hardly proved to be the case (Vaughan, 1998).
After the Challenger disaster, Vaughan, questioned whether the disaster was
simply a technological failure coupled with a failure of middle level management.
Vaughan investigated organizational, rather than individual, misconduct. According to
Vaughan (1996), the normalization of deviance
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occurs when actors in an organizational setting, such as a corporation or
government agency, come to define their deviant acts as normal and
acceptable because they fit with and conform to the cultural norms of the
organization within which they work. Even though their actions may
violate some outside legal or social standard and be labeled as criminal or
deviant by people outside the organization, organizational offenders do not
see these actions as wrong because they are conforming to the cultural
mandates that exist within the workgroup culture and environment where
they carry out their occupational roles (Vaughan, 1996 as cited in Kramer
& Kauzlarich, 2010, p.82).
The following section will apply Vaughan‟s theory of the Normalization
of Deviance to the Upper Big Branch Mine Explosion.
The Normalization of Deviance at the Upper Big Branch Mine
While trying to produce coal, and ultimately earn a profit, Massey Energy
accepted the faulty ventilation system, inadequate rock-dusting and poorly maintained
equipment ‒arguably a normalization of deviance akin to that of the Challenger
explosion. The pre-shift/on-shift examination system that was devised with the intention
of identifying problems and addressing them before they became disasters was a failure.
The majority of people would find it completely unacceptable for workers to drudge
through neck-deep water or be subjected to a consistently changing ventilation system,
which is a miner‟s only real lifeline in an underground mine, when this is not the standard
in coal mining. These types of practices can exist only in a workplace where the deviant
has become the normal, and the discussion in chapter two suggests that a great number of
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deviant practices were normalized at the Upper Big Branch Mine. These practices
included lack of air, illegal ventilation changes, engineering issues, water problems, lack
of safety equipment, inadequate rock dusting, an ineffective fireboss system, fraudulent
fireboss practices, faulty equipment and structure, airlock doors rather than overcasts, and
disabling safety mechanisms. I examine each of these below:
Lack of air. A chronic problem faced in some parts of the Upper Big Branch
Mine was extremely low airflow. As a result, it became very common for miners and
section bosses to “go get some air” by closing airlock doors or hanging curtains. While
airflow reversal is indicative of a serious problem with the mines ventilation plan,
however, at the Upper Big Branch Mine, this low airflow became part of the standard
operating procedure.
Illegal ventilation changes. Following the explosion, MSHA discovered that
major ventilation changes were being made while miners were actually working
underground in the mine. While this was a blatant disregard for worker safety, as well as
a violation of law, it was considered the norm at Upper Big Branch.
Engineering issues. The Upper Big Branch Mine lacked an effective engineering
design and rather than having an engineering plan to guide the mining process, several
persons testified that the mine was actually engineered as operations advanced further
into the mine. Evidence also suggests that the engineers who were working for Massey‟s
Route 3 Engineering were quite frequently not involved with ventilation changes made
by upper management at the mine. One of the engineers offered testimony to the
investigators, saying he “traveled underground at Upper Big Branch only once every
couple of years,” while another said he “had very little involvement with the Upper Big
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Branch Mine.” The most shocking testimony, however, came from an engineer who said
he “had never been underground at Upper Big Branch” (McAteer et al., 2011, p.98).
Water problems. The Upper Big Branch Mine had continual problems with high
water. This not only affected the ventilation system, but put miners at an enormous
safety risk. Miners, particularly very young, inexperienced workers, were continuously
sent into chest-deep water. Rather than consider such conditions hazardous, officials of
Upper Big Branch viewed those conditions “as just another job that had to be performed”
(McAteer et al., 2011, p.98).
Lack of safety equipment. Miners were frequently placed in hazardous
conditions deep in the mine with no communication, no vehicles, and no gas detectors
and only one means of entrance and egress. Sending miners into isolated parts of the
mine without even the most basic safety equipment can be regarded as a form of deviance
because it poses considerable threat to the life and well-being of each individual worker.
Inadequate rock dusting. Rock dusting has long been recognized as one of the
most basic elements of safe mining because it can help prevent flare-ups from turning
into major explosions. Rock dusting does not appear to have been a common practice at
the Upper Big Branch Mine because there was only a two-man crew assigned to dust the
entire mine on a part-time basis with rock dusting equipment that did not work properly.
Tests conducted after the explosion revealed severely inadequate dusting and return
entries. These entries that air returned through once it ventilated the entire mine were
completely black, indicating the area had not been rock dusted.
Ineffective fireboss system. The preshift/onshift examination process that was
meant to identify problems and protect the lives of the miners working was perpetually
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broken at the Upper Big Branch Mine. Records indicate that both state and federal
inspectors wrote citations for ventilation problems, however, fireboss records in the
majority of cases failed to reveal when and where the inadequate ventilation was found.
Because identifying unsafe conditions might have meant taking the man-hours to correct
the problems, it was widely acceptable at Massey Energy to do nothing. For example,
firebosses recorded the need to clean up high levels of coal dust, but there were no
records that the problems were ever addressed. In essence, it did not seem to matter
whether or not a fireboss did his/her job. In fact, records indicate that in the ten days
prior to the explosion, only eleven percent of the rock dustings requested were actually
completed.
Fraudulent fireboss practices. Weeks after the explosion, investigators
discovered that one Upper Big Branch foreman, who was responsible for assessing gas
and water levels in critical entries adjacent to the longwall panel, had not even turned on
his hand-held methane detector even though he had recorded gas readings in examiners
books. Data were downloaded from other foremen‟s methane detectors that indicated the
devices had also not been turned on at times when the foremen were underground and
responsible for identifying hazardous conditions. Not only is it a violation of state and
federal laws to fail to take these required readings, it also demonstrates a privileging of
profits over precautions. Furthermore, it suggests an extremely dangerous attitude that
firebossing a mine is just another burden imposed by both MSHA and the WVMHST.
Faulty equipment and structure. Inattention to equipment and structure was the
norm at the Upper Big Branch Mine, as evidenced by a poorly maintained top of the line
shearer, broken rock dusters, and damaged and defective airlock doors. MSHA tested the
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shearer and found water sprays missing or clogged, in addition to worn bits on the
machine, which exposed steel shafts that increased the danger of sparking. MSHA also
found that the water lines on the longwall could not sufficiently supply water to the
shearer in the event of a fire. Moreover, the mantraps were in terrible condition and the
main track haulage was not maintained in parts of the mine. As such, it seems that the
failure to maintain equipment and structure was not considered a safety issue that had the
potential to cause harm if not promptly addressed.
Airlock doors versus overcasts. Massey Energy often installed airlock doors in
its mines rather than constructing permanent overcasts to direct airflow, which are more
expensive and take longer to install than airlock doors. First, airlock doors are vulnerable
to damage if they are struck by heavy equipment moving through them. The doors can
also be compromised if they are accidentally left open by workers. Finally, and most
importantly, it is almost impossible to make them truly airtight, which means they
frequently leak methane to other parts of a mine. Hence, we can conclude that the doors
were used as a relatively inexpensive shortcut to address ventilation issues, without
regard for the best choice for the safety of workers.
Safety mechanisms disabled. Lots of testimony was given that suggested that
methane detectors on equipment had been “bridged out” or disabled, so that production
could continue without taking time to make repairs. Not only is this type of practice a
violation of state and federal law, it presents a constant danger to workers (McAteer et
al., 2011).
As indicated in the above section, certain deviant practices had become
normalized at the Upper Big Branch Mine. By allowing these practices to not only be
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normalized in the first place but to continue shows a clear indication that the desire to
make a profit was the number one priority at the Upper Big Branch Mine. As a result of
this desire, even the most basic safety regulations were repeatedly ignored, resulting in
the loss of twenty-nine innocent lives.
Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory
Institutional anomie theory, developed from Agnew‟s general strain theory and
Merton‟s anomie theory, provides that human behavior can be understood as a product of
social organization (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). There are two basic dimensions of
social organizations; culture and social structure. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) take
these two dimensions and focus their argument around the “American Dream” concept.
The American Dream is the idea that anyone can achieve material success regardless of
their upbringing/roots. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) theorize that the unrestrained
pursuit of the American Dream, the focus on the end goal and a relative de-emphasis on
the means of achieving it, exerts pressures toward crime whereby people are encouraged
to adopt an “anything goes” mentality in the pursuit of personal goals, creating an anomic
cultural environment.
Contextual anomie/strain theory, developed by Robinson and Murphy (2009) and
based upon Messner and Rosenfeld‟s institutional anomie theory, brings the idea of
maximization, defined as, “the concomitant utilization of legitimate (i.e., legal) and
illegitimate (i.e., illegal) means to achieve the goals associated with the American dream”
(Robinson & Murphy, 2009, p. 3), to understand corporate crime. Simply put,
maximization means abiding by the law and violating it at the same time. Like Messner

40

and Rosenfeld, Robinson and Murphy believe that the pursuit of the American dream
promotes criminality through greed, strain, and anomie.
Maximization occurs when an individual or corporation utilizes strategies of
“conformity” and “innovation” simultaneously. Conformity refers to the acceptance of
both cultural goals and institutional means and by doing so defining non-criminal, lawabiding behaviors. Innovation refers to the acceptance of the cultural goals and rejection
of the institutional means, leading to criminal type behavior. By using the concept of
maximization, one exercises both legitimate and illegitimate means to pursue the
American dream and by doing so steps into the role of “maximizer.” To fully become a
maximizer, one must have not only the knowledge and skills, but the opportunity to
engage in a legal trade as well as the knowledge, skills, and opportunity necessary to
commit criminal behavior in fulfillment of the American dream.
Robinson and Murphy (2009) apply their concept of maximization to corporate
crime, which they define as “illegal acts potentially punishable by criminal sanctions and
committed to advance the interests of the corporate organization” (p.40). Their theory,
contextual anomie/strain theory, focuses on elite deviance, or crimes of the powerful,
which as noted in the introduction, can be just as or far more dangerous and common
than ordinary street crime. They find that by taking concepts from anomie and strain
theory, as well as institutional anomie theory, they can identify why elites use
maximization to achieve their goals. Robinson and Murphy (2009) also explain that
greed is central to contextual anomie/strain theory and maximization in two ways. First,
all people are encouraged to be greedy simply by living in America, however, this does
not mean all people are. And second, some people are encouraged to be even more
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greedy as a result of the contexts or situations in which they find themselves. Large
corporations, such as coal companies, fall into this category.
Maximization at the Upper Big Branch Mine
Applying the concept of “maximization” to the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster,
one can argue that Massey Energy, owners of the Upper Big Branch Mine, displayed a
corporate mentality that continuously placed the drive to produce above worker safety.
In McAteer and colleagues (2011) report to the governor, the vast majority of miners
testified in regards to the pressure to produce coal, and some even directly stated that
Massey‟s safety program, Safety One (S-1), took a back seat to Production Two (P-2). In
the case of the Upper Big Branch Mine explosion, Robinson and Murphy‟s concept of
maximization, using illegitimate means, “innovation,” while at the same time abiding by
certain laws, “conformity,” can be seen in several different instances. Production reports,
injury reports, institutional secrecy, the idea that violations are a part of doing business,
intimidation of workers, “nasty notes,” disrespectful written messages from the coal
company president, and enhanced employment agreements are all forms of maximization
that were used at Upper Big Branch.
Production reports. Production reports at the Upper Big Branch Mine were
scheduled to be generated every 30 minutes regardless of whether coal was actually being
produced. The level of production was then relayed up the Massey management chain to
the headquarters of Massey Energy. In a case when production needed to be stopped
because of a dangerous condition, such as inadequate ventilation, the section boss was
instructed to write only “downtime” in his production report, rather than create a record
acknowledging a potentially deadly situation. This type of production reporting,
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combined with a certain lack of thoroughness in downtime reports, sent a very strong
message to workers about what management considered most important.
Injury reports. At the Upper Big Branch Mine, there was a large safety board on
the outside of the bathhouse with a space available to include the workers name when
reporting injuries. Due to the very public display of this information, workers might have
been inclined not to report the seriousness of injuries for fear of retaliation and
intimidation from management, as well as other workers.
Institutional secrecy. Workers at Upper Big Branch were not kept informed of
conditions in parts of the mine where they did not work. That type of information was
kept on a “need to know” basis and only a few privileged workers knew what was going
on throughout the mine. Miners, as well as section foremen, were not informed about
any ventilation changes so they had no idea how the air was supposed to travel.
Violations are part of doing business. Massey Energy officials have repeatedly
made public statements expressing their opinion that the number of violations issued
against the company as well as the severity of those violations are all part of the cost of
coal mining. At the same time, however, the company also maintained an ongoing public
relations campaign where officials gave an indication that their mines exceed industry
standards for workplace safety. And although this statement is not accurate, it was
widely believed to be true by workers, especially those who had never worked for other
mining companies.
To further call into question Massey‟s assertion about its safety standards,
between 2000 and 2009 MSHA proposed almost $2,000,000 in penalties for violations at
the Upper Big Branch Mine. To date, the company has paid just over $650,000, which
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amounts to only 33.3 percent of the total proposed because the company could repeatedly
fights the violations. As a result of these challenges, Massey Energy has paid only a third
of the assessed penalties over a ten-year period, while at the same time, continued to
increase its profits.
Intimidation of workers. Miners working at Upper Big Branch testified that
they were discouraged from stopping production for safety reasons and workers who
questioned those safety conditions were simply told to get on with production. In one
instance, foreman Brian “Hammer” Collins explained that he stopped his crew from
running coal because he discovered inadequate ventilation when he did his pre-shift
examination. Collins would not allow any work to start on his section until the problem
was resolved. The entire process took about an hour to fix. The following day, when he
arrived to work, he said Performance Coal Vice President Jason Whitehead suspended
him for three days for “poor work performance.” Collins should have been commended
for wanting to put the safety of his workers above production, but instead he was
reprimanded.
“Nasty notes.” During the investigation following the explosion, miners
mentioned receiving disrespectful written messages from Performance Coal President
Chris Blanchard. They explained that if a crew did not complete a job during a shift, a
nasty note would be waiting on the next shift. Glenn Ullman, a miner, described it as
“some sarcastic note for all my men to see… [you‟d] feel belittled” (McAteer et al., 2011,
p. 100). Some firebosses and foremen said in an interview that they were going to “run
coal right” and did not care if they were fired. Others, however, were intimidated by
Blanchard‟s “nasty notes” and did not say anything because they were “job-scared.”
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Enhanced employment agreements. Massey Energy also used enhanced
employment agreements to discourage workers from complaining about safety concerns
or working conditions. Under the terms of these agreements, the company offered pay
increases, bonuses, and guaranteed employment in exchange for employees‟ agreeing to
work for a three-year period. If they voluntarily left or if their employment was
terminated “for lack of performance as determined by management, unacceptable
conduct…or a serious safety infraction,” the miners had to return the enhanced pay and
all of the bonuses received under the contracts (McAteer et al., 2011, p. 100). In
addition, they could not work at any competitor‟s coal mine within a 90-mile radius of
the mine where they had worked for one year after their employment with Performance
Coal, owners of Massey Energy, ended.
Conclusions
This chapter has utilized the concept of the normalization of deviance as well as
maximization to explain how the actions and omissions of the officials of Massey Energy
resulted in the deaths of twenty-nine innocent miners. By letting miners continue to work
in a mine with a faulty ventilation system, inadequate rock-dusting and poorly maintained
equipment, Massey Energy officials put the need to turn a profit above the safety of their
workers. Some of the greatest dangers we face come from acts not labeled as crimes
(Reiman & Leighton, 2013) and in the instance of the Upper Big Branch Mine explosion,
‒that is most definitely the case.
The label “crime” is not used in the United States to name all or even the worst
actions that cause misery and suffering. That particular label is reserved for dangerous
actions often committed by the poor. Reiman and Leighton (2013) give the example of
45

an individual who boarded a commuter train and proceeded to shoot twenty-five people,
killing six, who following the incident was labeled a murderer, potentially even a mass
murderer. In the case of the Upper Big Branch Mine, however, Massey Energy officials,
who knowingly disregarded safety regulations, are just thought of as individuals who lost
employees in a tragic accident. Because an official does not intend to cause harm to his
workers and because he is only indirectly responsible for death or disability, while
pursuing legitimate economic goals, his acts are not labeled “crimes”.
Throughout my research and writing this thesis, I read numerous documents
surrounding this particular case, and from those documents, I found that the label of
“crime” and “criminal act” were only hinted at, particularly in any official state or federal
report. These documents gave great detail about the event itself and what was believed
the root cause to be, and even placed blame on the corporation, while at the same time
explaining Massey Energy‟s history of neglect for safety regulations. The official
reports, particularly McAteer and colleagues Report to the governor, never once used the
words crime or criminal act. As I was reading numerous media accounts of this incident,
I found something only slightly different. They were using the discourse of crime and
criminal act but only in regards to the criminal prosecutions of certain former Massey
Energy officials. And in those cases, officials were only being charged with faking
documents, lying to investigators and destroying evidence.
Not one piece of literature labeled Massey Energy as a murderer for killing
twenty-nine innocent miners. I believe that Massey Energy‟s knowing disregard for
safety regulations coupled, with its desire to generate a profit by producing as much coal
as possible, is the root cause for the Upper Big Branch Mine explosion.
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Chapter Five: Tragic Accident or Corporate Crime?

The following chapter will begin by explaining what actually constitutes a crime,
and what is needed in order for an act to be considered criminal. It will then briefly
describe the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007 enacted by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom, which I believe would be a very useful piece of
legislation in the United States. Finally, this chapter will explain any changes to the law
following the Upper Big Branch Mine explosion.
What Constitutes a Crime?
To date, no Massey Energy official has been held criminally responsible for the
deaths of the twenty-nine miners who lost their lives in the 2010 explosion at the Upper
Big Branch Mine in West Virginia. What if we consider the fact, however, that 100,000
Americans die annually from occupationally related diseases? Do these constitute
crimes? Officially, these deaths and the human suffering induced by willful neglect for
worker safety are not considered crimes. One observer has even argued that these deaths
caused by occupational injuries and diseases should be considered as criminal, as
murders.
By any legitimate criteria corporate executives who willfully make a
decision to expose workers to a dangerous substance which eventually
causes the death of some of the workers, should be considered murderers.
Yet no executive has ever served even a day in jail for such a practice, and
most probably are well rewarded for having saved the company money.
47

The regulatory apparatus that is complicit with such practices should of
course be considered an accomplice.” (Joel Swartz, an observer, as cited in
Simon, 1982, p. 113)
Nevertheless, in most cases, corporate officials and executives are not held
criminal liable because the actions executed do not establish the required mens rea, or
criminal intent, component to secure a conviction.
Even though laws are different throughout the world, most countries and states
differentiate between murder and manslaughter, including the state of West Virginia.
According to Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), “murder” is defined as the killing of
a human being with malice aforethought, or simply the intent to kill or inflict bodily
harm, while” manslaughter” is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice
aforethought. In the case of the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, because Massey
Energy officials did not specifically intend for their actions to result in the deaths of the
twenty-nine miners, it does not mean that they should not be held criminally culpable for
those actions.
“Culpable homicide,” originally a Scottish law, is defined by Black‟s Law
Dictionary as “a wrongful act that results in a person‟s death but does not amount to
murder.” The idea of culpability simply describes the level of one‟s blameworthiness in
regards to the commission of a crime. According to Robinson (1980) there are five
defined levels of culpability: “purposely,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” “negligently,” and
faultlessly or “absolute liability” (Robinson, 1980). Known as culpable homicide in
Scotland, the United States employs the term “criminally negligent homicide” or
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manslaughter. Criminally negligent homicide results from the careless performance of a
legal or illegal act in which the danger is apparent.
“Negligence” refers to the failure to meet the legal standards established in order
to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm (Black‟s Law Dictionary). In the case
of the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, an example of a negligent action would be the
failure to follow all the safety regulations put in place by MSHA officials that were
meant to protect the lives of workers in the mine in West Virginia. “Recklessness” is
conduct by which the actors, in this case the Upper Big Branch Mine officials, do not
desire harmful consequences but nonetheless foresee the possibility and consciously take
the risk (Black‟s Law Dictionary). By forcing miners to work with continuously failing
equipment and in extremely hazardous conditions, officials of Upper Big Branch Mine
were knowingly committing reckless actions. Criminally negligent manslaughter can
also occur when there is an omission to act when there is a duty to do so (Black‟s Law
Dictionary). Mining companies are required to follow all safety regulations established
to protect and ensure the safety of employees. The Upper Big Branch Mine was cited for
more than 500 violations in the year prior to the 2010 explosion and failed to take that
information and improve the conditions within the mine for workers. The failure to do so
resulted in one of the worst mining accidents in forty-years.
Corporate Manslaughter
In cases where negligence and recklessness are evident, like at the Upper Big
Branch Mine, it is difficult for prosecutors to convict an entire corporation for a criminal
act. For an American corporation to receive a manslaughter conviction, the prosecution
must show that one person who is the “controlling mind” of the company committed the
49

reckless or negligent acts or omissions which led to the accident and potential deaths
(Corporate Manslaughter, n.d.). If convicted, the corporation is punished with the
payment of fines and very rarely any jail time. Corporations commit crimes in all parts
of the world. Unlike in the United States, however, the Parliament of the United
Kingdom decided that corporations should be held more accountable and liable for their
actions and passed the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007.
This act created a new offense, deemed as “corporate manslaughter” in England, Wales,
and Northern Ireland and “corporate homicide” in Scotland. Under this act, to establish
criminal liability, the prosecution has to prove five things; (1) that the offender is a
qualifying organization; (2) that the organization owed a relevant duty of care to the
victim; (3) that actions or omissions caused the death of the victim; (4) that the death is
attributable to conduct falling far below what could reasonably be expected of the
organization in the circumstances (gross breach); and (5) that the organization‟s activities
were managed by its senior management in a way that constituted a substantial element in
the gross breach (Gobert, 2008). To date, the United Kingdom has successfully
convicted four corporations under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide
Act of 2007. Even with the success of this act in the United Kingdom, the United States
has yet to follow suit and enact this piece, or any new piece of legislation.
Changes to the Law Following the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster
Following a major mine disaster, Congress, often enacts a new piece of legislation
that focuses on improving the failures that led to the disaster. In contrast to previous
mine disasters mentioned throughout this thesis, however, the Upper Big Branch disaster
has yet to yield passage of new legislation. This was not for lack of trying by several
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Democratic Representatives. California Representative George Miller proposed the
Robert C. Byrd Mine Safety Protection Act of 2010 following the disaster at the Upper
Big Branch Mine. This bill, H.R. 6495 (2010), would have amended the last piece of
mine legislation, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, to empower miners to
raise safety concerns. Unfortunately this bill “failed under suspension” when it did not
receive the 2/3 required vote to pass.
After failing to pass the first time, Representative Miller tried again the following
year by introducing the Robert C. Byrd Mine Safety Protection Act of 2011. This act was
exactly like the act proposed by Miller the previous year. Congress referred this bill,
H.R. 1579 (2011) to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. It died after
no action to pass it was taken (H.R. 1579, 2011).
On March, 21, 2013, West Virginia Democratic Representative Nick J. Rahall
joined forces with Representative Miller and introduced the Robert C. Byrd Mine Safety
Protection Act of 2013 (H.R. 1373). This legislation, like the previous two, is aimed at
strengthening the efforts to protect coal miners‟ health and safety. This bill, however,
would also require mine operators to maintain records of rock dust purchases so MSHA
can verify efforts made by operators to prevent any build-up of explosive coal dust. In
addition, this bill requires MSHA to develop a staffing succession plan to ensure that
there are a sufficient number of trained personnel to help keep miners safe (H.R. 1373,
2013). At the time of this writing (June 2013), this bill has been referred to the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, where no decision has been made. Despite
numerous efforts, however, this bill has only a one percent chance of getting past the
committee (H.R. 1373 Govtrack).
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The third anniversary of the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster recently passed as
individuals continue to dedicate themselves to preventing such a catastrophic event from
occurring again. Representative Rahall said it best:
while no piece of legislation can remove all of the dangers inherent in coal
mining, we have a responsibility to advance sensible improvements in our
national mine health and safety program that we know can save lives…we
must not wait for further loss of life from a preventable tragedy to act to
bolster our mine safety laws that we know are inadequate…this legislation
is an important step in making good on an obligation we have to the health
and safety of our courageous miners and their families. (quoted in Nyden,
2013)
Conclusions
This thesis has described what MSHA officials believe to be the cause of the
explosion, a spark that ignited methane gas and that was fueled by coal dust that had built
up throughout the mine. This thesis has also described the failures of the three main
basic safety systems that were there to protect the lives of the miners. Finally, this thesis
provided details about Massey Energy‟s history of mining disasters. Massey Energy
frequently put the need to produce coal to make a profit above the safety of their workers,
and this thesis provides great detail supporting that fact, particularly at the Upper Big
Branch Mine.
Massey Energy was cited over 500 times in the year prior to the 2010 explosion,
most of which were tied up in appeals, allowing them to postpone or even disregard any
changes needed based on the citations given. Legislation passed prior to this explosion
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did not prevent mining companies from this, and since the explosion no new piece of
legislation has been passed, though several attempts have been made. Not updating the
laws and changing things to help better protect the miner shows a lack of care on the part
of state and federal officials.
Despite investigations following the explosion, no criminal charges were filed
against Massey Energy for the deaths of the twenty-nine miners. The actions of Massey
Energy officials at no point have ever been deemed as criminal. Rather than think of this
event as a crime because officials knowingly allowed work to continue in unsafe
conditions, it is thought of as just another tragic coal mine accident. Not placing the
blame for the deaths of the miners on Massey Energy shows a coal mine disaster has
always been and will always be thought of as just a tragic, unpreventable accident.
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